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Abstract
This two-part paper proposes a new collaborative approach to airframe maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO). A quantitative model
is introduced in Part I to represent the business relationships between original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and MRO enterprises.
In Part II, the presented model is used to assess potential financial benefits obtained by each of these stakeholders as a result of the
collaboration.
The quantitative model is built to capture the main dependencies between an independent MRO enterprise operating in South America
and its interactions with three major airframe OEMs. Interviews were conducted with MRO and OEM professionals to identify the most
impactful operational resources on MRO activities. Stakeholders with different characteristics in terms of production capacity, annual
revenue, fleet size, and age are considered in numerical studies to quantify the viability of the proposed collaborative business model in
different scenarios.
The obtained results show that optimal investment levels must be determined for each stakeholder to ensure the viability of the
proposed collaborative business model, confirming the need for a quantitative method to aid service designers making decisions.
The novel collaborative model contributes to the relatively scarce literature on the topic, and promotes effective and structured
collaboration between OEMs and MRO enterprises aiming at delivering higher added value to end customers (operators).
Keywords: airframe maintenance, repair and overhaul, product–service design, collaborative business model

Introduction
An increasing demand for independent aviation maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) services has been perceived
over the last few years (Rosenberg, 2004). As a result of this trend, aircraft owners and operators started to outsource heavy
maintenance activities and large MRO companies emerged, such as Singapore Technologies Aerospace, AAR Corp, Timco
Aviation Services, Lufthansa Technik, Haeco Group, and others (Tegtmeier, 2013). Along that trend, smaller independent
service providers appeared around the globe, quickly accounting for 80% of the MRO market (PIPAME, 2010).
However, this new outsourced maintenance market implies some challenges to these independent MRO companies. They
usually serve different airlines with several models of aircrafts, and hence are often compelled to heavily invest in resources
such as equipment, spare parts, and training in order to attend a variety of aircraft models at high service levels. Often, the
acquisition of these resources does not represent an attractive investment, thus entailing a direct impact on financial results.
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For instance, service providers frequently see themselves
as forced to have some special equipment which is only
required to perform very specific maintenance tasks for a
particular aircraft model. Such tasks have a low frequency
of occurrence; as a consequence, resources are underutilized, resulting to low return on investment. Special tools
rental options are available in the market; however, they do
not always constitute a timely and reliable solution. This
situation imposes significant financial challenges to MRO
firms. In summary: at one end operators rely on MRO
companies to provide them with high-level maintenance
services, while at the other end MRO companies may
struggle financially to keep their maintenance capacity
broad enough to support a wide range of aircraft.
Airframe original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have
also been requested increasingly by operators to provide
better in-service support. However, an OEM-owned, worldwide customer support structure that is capable of offering
full maintenance services is economically infeasible. Moreover, it has been observed that existing business practices
related to airframe maintenance services may result in
predatory competition among stakeholders (Goncalves &
Kokkolaras, 2017). Specifically, due to the low level of inservice support offered by airframe manufacturers and
maintenance providers over the years, many operators (such
as commercial airlines or air force organizations) have
developed their own fleet maintenance stations. However,
cost effectiveness is a big challenge, since maintenance is not
their core business. Some operators, in order to justify the
investments made in large maintenance structures, started
to provide services to smaller operators, adding a new
challenge to the maintenance market, as they were then
competing with OEM service centers and independent
maintenance providers (Vieira & Loures, 2016).
This research work proposes the consideration of a new
business strategy as a more rational alternative for this
paradoxical scenario, where manufacturers compete with
their own customers. The new strategy suggests that OEMs
and MRO companies should align their business interests
to foster a collaborative environment that will benefit them
both. Given that the operational life of an aircraft can be
more than 50 years, there is a significant opportunity for
aviation OEMs and MRO companies to profit from a
collaborative product–service system (PSS) business model
that can provide operational excellence by supporting the
product during its in-service life (Goncalves & Kokkolaras,
2015). By creating a sustainable partnership, maintenance
providers and manufacturers could offer higher service
levels to operators. The business relations between these
two players could be designed under the approach of cooperation to maximize availability of operational resources at
these maintenance centers. Having the right resources
available when required, MRO companies would become a
more effective maintenance option for operators. In other
words, the greater the availability of these resources for the
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MRO company during maintenance activities, the more
efficient will be the execution of the service, resulting in
reduced maintenance turnaround time (TAT), thus additional
value to operators.
Aiming at identifying the most relevant resources for
MRO companies’ efficient operations, this research has
conducted interviews with MRO and OEM professionals
from Brazil, Spain, Argentina, and Chile (where the interviewees were an engineering/planning manager, a quality
and regulations manager with more than 30 years of
experience in the international MRO sector, a maintenance
manager, an experienced MRO specialist, a chief executive
officer of an MRO business in South America, and a
maintenance supervisor with more than 30 years of MRO
experience), and the main question was: what are the most
impactful operational resources for MRO activities? There
was consensus among the interviewees that the four types
of operational resources that have the highest impact on the
TAT are: product data; spare parts; tooling and equipment;
and qualified technical personnel.
Therefore, the collaboration approach proposed herein
suggests the thesis that OEMs and MRO firms should
develop a win–win partnership where these companies
could mutually cooperate by exchanging those critical
resources, as depicted in Figure 1.
As mentioned above, product data, spare parts, tooling,
equipment, and training are essential resources for MRO
activities. Therefore, an OEM could contribute to increase
availability of these resources by enabling the partner
maintenance providers to have access to product data, or
sharing spare parts and equipment, or even offering special
conditions for technical training. On the other hand, OEMs
are highly interested in the in-service data collected by
MRO firms over long periods of time for a variety of
aircraft. This would provide valuable information and
knowledge to an OEM’s product design process and thus
increase product reliability while reducing costs related to
re-design and warranty claims.
In summary, this paper proposes a collaborative PSS
approach to airframe in-service support. A quantitative
model is developed to map the main business relationships
between the OEM, the MRO enterprise, and the operator.
This model enables engineers to perform quantitative analysis to assess financial feasibility as well as value added of
different collaboration business models. Due to paper length
limitations, numerical results are presented in the companion
of this paper (Part II).
The Proposed Collaboration Model
One of the key variables of this quantitative model is the
TAT, which refers to the elapsed time of a maintenance
check. In the context of this study, when a TAT increase is
mentioned, it refers to the delay to the planned maintenance
service schedule. A reduced TAT corresponds to added
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Figure 1. Proposed value and data flow in OEM and MRO collaboration.

value to operators. According to the Federal Aviation
Administration (2013), one of the three main reasons that
operators outsource maintenance activities to MRO concerns is the reduced TAT to complete the service, since
these maintenance providers have higher level of specialization.
In that sense, if TAT reduction means value added to
operators, then it can be assumed that reducing the risk of
TAT increase is a value-added objective within an MRO
business. Conceptually, the risk of TAT increase is
inversely proportional to the level of resource availability.
Indeed, the shortage of any of the above resources implies
risk of TAT increase, so the researchers propose to capture the
relation between TAT increase and resource availability as
ETIresi ~TIres iavg |IGres i ;

ð1Þ

where ETIresi is the expected TAT increase (days) due to lack
of resource resi; TIres iavg is the average TAT increase (days) in
the case of resource resi not being available when required;
and IGresi is the investment gap (%) that represents the
probability of lacking resi. It is defined as
IGres i ~

(IRresi {ISOEMresi {IMROresi )
;
IRresi

ð2Þ

where IRresi is the required investment in resource resi in order
to completely mitigate the risk of its unavailability. The
amount of required investment needs to be set as a parameter
in the mathematical model and will usually depend on the
MRO company’s production capacity. It can either be obtained
with an MRO expert or from the MRO company’s historical
data. ISOEMresi is the investment shared by the OEM and
IMROresi represents the actual investment in resi made by the

MRO company. The value of TIres iavg is also a parameter to be
set in the model and it can also be estimated by an MRO
expert, obtained from an MRO company’s historical data, or
even calculated by using the program evaluation and review
technique/critical path method (PERT/CPM) (Darci, 2004).
Most MRO companies adopt specific software based on
PERT/CPM to plan and schedule maintenance tasks with the
objective of better managing and reducing TAT through
critical path analysis. By so doing, MRO companies are able to
plan the usage of resources, estimate TAT for each aircraft
shop visit in a more precise manner, and also better monitor
the progress of the maintenance tasks during the project
execution. In addition, this type of technique also enables
analysis of impacts on service schedule caused by deviations
such as lack of required resources or any other technical
problem encountered during the execution of the maintenance
activities. Figure 2 conceptually illustrates the main phases of
an aircraft heavy maintenance check: in Phase 1 the aircraft is
completely cleaned and has all its access panels opened for
inspection; Phase 2 is when all the scheduled visual inspections, functional tests, operational tests, and other nondestructive tests are performed, and therefore it can be said that this is
the phase where all the aircraft discrepancies are identified; in
Phase 3, the discrepancies previously identified are corrected
by means of parts replacements or repairs. Usually, the more
significant TAT delays originate from Phase 3 activities, where
the majority of the unplanned resource demand occurs; at last,
once all the aircraft discrepancies are resolved, then the aircraft
enters into Phase 4 for final tests and delivery preparation.
Within the context of this study, the TAT increase
caused by unavailability of required resources is considered
to happen in the ‘‘rectification phase’’ of the aircraft heavy
maintenance, as shown in Figure 2. Therefore, the value of
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Figure 2. Conceptual scheme of the impact on TAT due to lack of resources.

TIres iavg can be obtained by taking the difference between
the acquisition time of the resource (including procurement
time, import time, transportation, and utilization) and the
time originally planned for Phase 3. The average acquisition
time of the unplanned resource can be estimated by an MRO
expert or even obtained from the purchasing department’s
historical data. That type of information (also called logistic
lead times) is usually recorded and stored in material and
resources planning systems. The planned time of each phase
is estimated by the MRO expert and depends on the type of
maintenance check as well as on the type of aircraft.
To facilitate the reader’s comprehension of the rationale
adopted to construct the proposed model, the following
summary is given:
a. The amount of investments made by OEM or MRO
company in any of the required resources (i.e., product data, spare parts, tooling, or training) represents
the level of financial collaboration from each company in the PSS.
b. The individual investments in resources correspond
to the input variables.
c. The higher the total investments, the more maintenance
capacity the MRO company will offer; therefore, the
shorter will be the aircraft’s downtime during heavy
maintenance, meaning higher savings to operators.
d. Every investment made by the OEM in resources
required for the PSS represents a positive impact on
the MRO company’s gross profit.
e. The more in-service data the MRO company shares
with the OEM, the higher is the OEM’s savings with

inventory reduction due to increased demand forecast capacity.
f. The impact on MRO company’s and OEM’s gross
profit are output variables as well as the total operator savings.
g. The more heavy the checks performed by the MRO
company, the more in-service data are generated.
The number of heavy checks per year performed by
the MRO company is a PSS configuration parameter.
h. The operator’s fleet size and number of flight hours
per year per aircraft are also PSS configuration
parameters. The larger the fleet size and the greater
the number of flown hours, the more savings the
operator can accumulate throughout the year.
i. All formulas and linear models presented in this
paper are developed and proposed as first principles
by the authors.
Given the overall rationale as the foundation for the
proposed quantitative approach, each resource is taken into
consideration by the model to capture the effects of variations of its availability on financial results to stakeholders
as well as on TAT to operators.
Spare Parts and Tooling
Spare parts and tools availability is one of the key factors
for ensuring continuous operations in an MRO company.
The lack of those resources when needed during maintenance activities directly implies delays of the TAT to
operators. In the scope of this research, the types of spare
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parts are classified as follows (Goncalves & Kokkolaras,
2017): consumable; light expendable; heavy expendable;
and rotable. The main types of tools and equipment considered herein are: nondestructive inspection equipment;
hydraulic carts; special tools; test sets; and special jigs.
The estimated TAT increase caused by the lack of these
resources during maintenance services will be individually
calculated for each of the above types, by applying
Equation (1). The values of parameters such as TIres iavg
and IRresi are chosen depending on the type of resource. For
instance, TIhepavg is the average TAT increase (days)
resulting from the unavailability of a heavy expendable
part. In most of the cases, lacking a required heavy expendable when needed during maintenance check execution
implies a significant TAT delay, caused by the usually
longer procurement time for that type of part. Assuming
that during a maintenance check the demand for most of
the heavy expendable parts will be known only after the
inspection phase (see Figure 2 for reference on maintenance check phases), and heavy expendables usually
require heavier subsequent maintenance activities such as
heat treatment, shot peening, machining, complex installation, and extensive access closing, then the impact of
TIhepavg on the rectification phase can also be calculated by
using the PERT/CPM technique. The logistics lead times
and maintenance tasks durations can be either estimated by
experts or obtained from statistical data for that type of
spare part.
The investment gap related to heavy expendable parts
IGhep is
IGhep ~

(IRhep {ISOEMhep {IMROhep )
;
IRhep

ð3Þ

where IRhep is the required investment amount in heavy
expendable parts in order to mitigate the risk of unavailability of that resource. That variable also represents a
model’s parameter which shall be set as per MRO
company’s production capacity (production scale and types
of aircrafts). It can be either estimated by an expert or
obtained from historical data. ISOEMhep is the investment
shared by the OEM and IMROhep is the actual investment in
heavy expendable parts made by the MRO company.
The TAT increases resulting from unavailability of other
types of spare parts or tools are similarly calculated using
Equations (1) and (2). Each type will present specific parameters TIresiavg and IRresi as per the individual characteristics
of each resource. For example, TIcpavg is the average TAT
increase (days) resulting from the unavailability of a
consumable part. It can be obtained by taking the difference
between the estimated acquisition time of consumable parts
and the time originally planned for Phase 3 (cf. Figure 2).
In most cases, if the MRO company lacks a required
consumable, the delay in TAT should not be significant
since the procurement and acquisition time for this type
of material is short and it can usually be bought locally.

In addition, consumables usually do not require long subsequent activities, just simple tasks such as access panel
closing. The value of IRcp represents the investment
required in consumable parts and is related to the MRO
company’s production capacity (i.e., production scale and
types of aircrafts produced): the higher the production
capacity, the larger the inventory required, and the higher
the investment needed. It can be either estimated by an
expert or obtained from historical data.
In summary, the rationale used to formulate the TAT
increase as a function of the resources availability level is
as follows: the smaller the investment gap, the lower the
risk of TAT delay. Thus, hypothetically, if an MRO company
has unlimited resources, then the risk of TAT delays would be
zero. However, as a matter of fact, enterprises usually face
resource limitations imposed by budgetary constraints. Having
large inventories of spare parts and tooling requires high
investments for an MRO company, which most of the time is
not economically sustainable. Therefore, the concept considered by the proposed model is that OEM and MRO
company should split these investments to develop a financially feasible collaboration. This mathematical model proposes to evaluate the financial feasibility of the collaboration
by analyzing the impact on gross profit for both companies
generated by the related investments.
For instance, if an OEM invests in an MRO company by
providing resources such as spare parts and tooling to that
maintenance provider, this investment would cause a
negative impact on the OEM’s gross profit. On the other
hand, that same investment would lead to a positive impact
on the MRO company’s gross profit. The opposite effect
would occur when the MRO company shares its resources
with the OEM. Hence, this model proposes to calculate
the final balance of impact on gross profit to use it as a
financial indicator of the PSS’s economic viability. The
impact on gross profit was selected as an indicator due to
its direct relation to operational costs, enabling assessment
of the company’s efficiency at labor and supplies. In
accounting, gross profit, also known as gross margin, is a
company’s revenue minus the cost of making a product or
providing a service, before deducting indirect fixed costs
like office expenses, rent, administrative costs, and taxation.
The annual impact on an OEM’s gross profit, resulting from
the investment in any of the previously described resources
resi made on MRO, is given by
IGPOEMresi ~

OCOEMresi
;
GPOEM

ð4Þ

where GPOEM is the OEM’s gross profit and OCOEMresi is the
annual opportunity cost of the investment in that resource
made by the OEM in MRO; it is formulated as
P
OCOEMresi ~{( ni~1 OEMIres i )|IR;
ð5Þ
where OEMIresi is the monetary amount invested in resi by
the OEM in the MRO company and IR is the interest rate.
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The positive impact on the MRO company’s gross profit
due to investment in resi received from the OEM is
IGPMROresi ~

({OCOEMresi {OCMROresi )
;
GPMRO

ð6Þ

where GPMRO is the MRO company’s gross profit and
OCMROresi is the annual opportunity cost of the investment
in resi made by the MRO company, given by
P
ð7Þ
OCMROresi ~( ni~1 MROIresi )|IR;
where MROIresi is the investment in resi made by the MRO
company.
Technical Data
During the development of an aircraft, as part of its
certification requirements, the OEM must produce several
types of technical publications. The aircraft maintenance
manual is one of the most important publications to MRO
companies, as it provides detailed technical instructions for
proper performance of the maintenance tasks. The maintenance providers also rely on other important product data
to ensure efficiency of their operations, reducing cycle time
to resolve technical problems found during maintenance services execution. Agility to resolve technical problems results in
shorter aircraft downtime, meaning value to operators. The
main types of product data considered in this research work
are: 1) installation drawings; 2) fabrication drawings; 3)
component maintenance manuals; and 4) service bulletins.
On the other hand, during aircraft shop visits, MRO
firms collect significant amounts of in-service data such
as maintenance and pilot reports; maintenance actions;
troubleshooting reports; or component shop reports. These
data represent valuable information to OEMs and can be
used to identify weaknesses of their products, thus promoting improvement opportunities related to the product
reliability and consequently enhanced maintenance programs (Canaday, 2016).
Product Data
Technical product data produced by OEMs are usually
sold to MRO firms through annual subscriptions, where the
more the access to data required, the higher the price.
Product data are also an important resource for MRO
operations, as quick access to them may represent on-time
technical problems resolution. In contrast, the lack of this
type of data during a maintenance event creates the risk of
TAT increase. The TAT increase resulting from product
data unavailability is formulated for each type of data and
its relationship with spare parts resources as follows:
ETIpdi ~(LTpdi |IGpdi )zETIresi ;

ð8Þ

where ETIpdi is the estimated TAT increase caused by the
unavailability of one of the four required product data
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resources when needed. LTpdi is the average acquisition
lead time (days) of the related product data resource during
maintenance activities. This value can be estimated by
senior purchasing department personnel or obtained from
historical data. ETIresi is the previously estimated TAT
increase due to lack of that product’s related spare part.
For example, in most cases an installation drawing will call
up light expendable parts such as attaching parts, thus
the expected procurement and logistics time for acquisition of those parts must compose the referred function.
Additionally, fabrication drawings relate to heavy expendable parts, component maintenance manuals may call up
rotable parts, and service bulletins may also relate to light
expendable parts. IGpdi is the investment gap (%) related to
that product data resource and it represents the probability
of lacking this resource during maintenance activities. It is
calculated as
IGpdi ~

(IRpd i {ISOEMpdi {IMROpdi )
IRpdi

;

ð9Þ

where IRpdi is the investment required by the MRO
company for acquisition of those specific product data in
order to have prompt availability of that resource when
needed. ISOEMpdi is the investment shared by the OEM
(by granting free limited access to that type of product data
for partner MRO companies) and IMROpdi is the actual
investment in subscriptions of that product data resource
made by the MRO company.
As previously mentioned, in usual commercial conditions OEMs sell product data to MRO companies by
means of annual subscriptions; therefore when sharing this
resource with MRO companies, as proposed in this work,
OEMs would lose revenue. That negative impact on an
OEM’s gross profit IGPOEMpd can be assessed by the
proposed collaboration business model. It is calculated as
P
ð10Þ
IGPOEM pd ~ ni~1 IGPOEMpdi ;
where IGPOEM pdi is the negative impact (%) on the
OEM’s gross profit resulting from the revenue reduction
with technical data subscriptions caused by the concession
of free limited access to the referred product data for the
MRO company. It is calculated as the ratio between the
investment in the specific product data made by the OEM
OEMIpdi to support the MRO company and the OEM’s
gross profit GPOEM:
IGPOEMpdi ~{

OEMIpdi
:
GPOEM

ð11Þ

On the other hand, OEMs sharing their product data with
MRO companies creates a positive impact on MRO firms’
gross profit since they are reducing expenditures related to
product data subscriptions. This positive impact on MRO
firms’ gross profit is
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IGPMROpd ~

Pn

i~1

IGPMROpdi :

ð12Þ

It is calculated based on the ratio between the MRO
firm’s investment in product data MROIpdi and the MRO
firm’s gross profit GPMRO:
IGPMROpdi ~

({MROIpdi zOEMIpdi )
:
GPMRO

ð13Þ

In-Service Data
In the MRO growing market, the increasing amounts
of in-service data (collected from maintenance reports
produced during aircraft shop visits) have attracted the
attention of OEMs since this information can be used to
perform statistical analysis and identification of weaknesses
of a product (Rosenberg, 2004). Product reliability can
be improved based on that outcome, enabling increased
maintenance intervals, fewer shop visits, and consequently
less interruption of aircraft operations. OEMs can offer
increased fleet dispatch reliability, which is an important
quality indicator as well as a strong selling point. Boeing
has been making significant improvements in maintenance
programs by applying statistical analysis on in-service
data. From 1997 to 2011 Boeing optimized its B737-NG
airplane’s maintenance program, being able to extend
1000 flight hours in hangar scheduled maintenance
intervals every four years, which is on average 250 flight
hours per year (McLoughlin, Doulatshahi, & Onorati,
2011). Based on Boeing’s data, this paper proposes to
model the relation between the amount of in-service data
available to OEMs and the resulting maintenance interval
increase as follows:
MIIyear ~NRAyear |MIIRFH=rep ;

ð14Þ

where MIIyear is the heavy maintenance interval increase
(flight hours) per year promoted by an OEM for a specific
aircraft model and NRAyear represents the annual number
of maintenance reports available from MRO companies to
OEMs, calculated as
NRAyear ~NRAC=year |NHCyear ;

ð15Þ

where NRAC/year is a parameter representing the estimated
number of maintenance reports generated by one aircraft
in a one-year time span. This number can be estimated
by an MRO expert or obtained from statistical analysis
using previous heavy checks data. The parameter NHCyear
represents the number of planned heavy checks per year
to be performed by the MRO company. This value shall
be defined according to the production capacity of the
MRO company. The maintenance interval increase ratio
MIIRFH/rep expresses the maintenance interval increase
(flight hours) produced by one maintenance report, and is
calculated as

MIIRFH=rep ~

250
:
(240|NRAC=year )

ð16Þ

Considering Boeing’s publication (McLoughlin et al.,
2011), which reports 1000 flight hours increase of maintenance intervals in four years, this work proposes the use of
the constant 250 in Equation (16), corresponding to the maximum annual maintenance interval increase that OEMs would
be able to produce. In addition, the constant 240 represents
the reasonable number of aircrafts per year that would be
required to produce sufficient in-service data to enable
statistical analysis to be translated into conclusive maintenance interval increase. This value is defined based on an
Airbus study that uses in-service data produced by 240
aircrafts (A320 model) operated by EasyJet over a time
period of four years (Canaday, 2016). The model proposed
herein does not take into account the financial benefit that
OEMs would obtain as a result of their sales increase for
offering a more reliable product to the market. More reliable
airplanes enable stretched maintenance intervals, which
certainly promotes economic advantages to aircraft operators.
In fact, Lee, Ma, Thimm, and Verstraeten (2008) mention
a case where a European airline achieved a 25% reduction
in its direct maintenance cost by reusing in-service data.
Therefore, the total annual savings that OEMs could promote
to operators by using in-service data from MRO companies
are formulated as the sum of the annual savings due to direct
maintenance cost reduction and the annual savings resulting
from increased heavy maintenance intervals:
TOpSisdata ~OpSdmcred zOpSmiincr :

ð17Þ

Based on Lee et al. (2008), Opsdmcred is calculated as
25% of the total direct maintenance cost:


OFS
OpSdmcred ~0:25|
|EMCperAC |OFS; ð18Þ
240
where OFS is the operator’s fleet size. The number 240 is
the ideal fleet size, as per an Airbus study (Canaday, 2016),
so that number is used as the basis for the assumption that
240 aircrafts would produce sufficient data to promote
conclusive statistical analysis and enable maintenance cost
reduction of the order of 25%. EMCperAC corresponds to the
estimated annual maintenance cost per aircraft and is given by
EMCperAC ~FHYperAC |FHC;

ð19Þ

where FHYperAC is a parameter representing the aircraft
estimated flight hours per year. FHC is the cost per flight hour
which herein is considered as $71.00 (Ali & McLoughlin,
2012). The annual savings for the operator resulting from
increased heavy maintenance intervals are calculated as
OpSmiincr ~DTRperAC |OFS|LDC;

ð20Þ

where LDC is the aircraft leasing cost per day (assumed
hypothetically herein as $20,000) and DTRperAC is the annual
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downtime reduction per aircraft due to longer intervals and
increased product reliability, calculated as the difference
between the average downtime per year for a heavy check
ADT and the calculated downtime CDT:
DTRperAC ~(ADT{CDT);

ð21Þ

with the average downtime per year for a heavy check being
calculated as
ADT~NHCperAC=Y |MDTavg=hc ;

ð22Þ

where NHCperAC/Y is the number of heavy checks for
each operator aircraft per year and MDTavg/hc is one of
the model’s parameters representing the market average
aircraft downtime for a heavy check of a specific aircraft
model. The number of heavy checks per aircraft per year
is expressed as
NHCperAC=Y ~

FHYperAC
;
MMIavg=hc

ð23Þ

where MMIavg/hc is a parameter corresponding to the
market average maintenance interval for a heavy check,
considered as being 6000 flight hours in this study (Ali &
McLoughlin, 2012).
The calculated annual downtime CDT is
CDT~NNHCperAC=Y |MDTavg=hc ;

ð24Þ

where NNHCperAC/Y corresponds to the new number of
heavy checks for each operator aircraft per year after the
maintenance interval increase and is calculated as
NNHCperAC=Y ~

FHYperAC
;
NMIhc

ð25Þ

with NMIhc representing the new increased maintenance
interval for a heavy check, being calculated as
NMIhc ~MMIavg=hc zMIIyear :

ð26Þ

As previously mentioned, the proposed product–service
collaboration business model delivers value to OEMs by
enabling these companies to forecast more accurately spare
parts demand, thus promoting significant cost reduction
through more efficient inventory management.
As maintenance providers, MRO companies collect
valuable information on spare parts consumption, since
all data related to the aircraft parts replaced in each shop
visit are recorded and stored in databases, allowing the
accumulation of significant amounts of information on
parts consumption along the years. According to the collaboration proposal presented in this research, data can be
shared with OEMs, promoting identification of the most
demanded parts per aircraft model and geographical area.
This information enables OEMs to optimize their inventory
levels, generating cost reductions.
A case study developed by an aerospace OEM and
published by the SAS Institute discusses potential gains
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that can be obtained with enhanced parts demand forecasting (SAS, 2014). This study reports that a manufacturer
was able to increase significantly the accuracy of forecasting and consequently reduce inventory costs by automating
statistical analysis of in-service data. The return over
investment after one year was estimated to be within the
range of $10–15 million.
Another study (Cohen & Wille, 2006) also quantifies
gains derived from parts inventory optimization promoted by better consumption forecasting as a result of
historical data analysis. In that research is mentioned an
inventory cost reduction of $1 million per aircraft over ten
years, representing an annual reduction of $100,000 per
aircraft.
Therefore, in order to model the relation between the
amount of in-service data and the inventory cost reduction,
this research proposes to use the parameters reported in
Cohen and Wille (2006) and SAS (2014) combined with
the ones in Canaday (2016), which reports that 240 aircrafts
in four years produced reasonable amounts of in-service
data to enable conclusive statistical analysis, to build up the
assumption that 480 heavy checks (considering each aircraft has one heavy check every two years) would produce
sufficient data to promote annual inventory gains of the
order of $10 million. Moreover, considering the business
model where MRO companies will share maintenance data
with OEMs, the annual savings due to inventory cost
reduction for OEMs are directly proportional to the number
of heavy checks performed by MRO companies for a
specific aircraft type:


NHCyear
;
ð27Þ
ISOEM ~(10,000,000)|
480
while the positive impact on an OEM’s gross profit is
calculated by
IGPOEMinv ~

ISOEM
:
GPOEM

ð28Þ

Qualified Technical Personnel
MRO providers depend on a skilled technical labor force
to produce good-quality and efficient maintenance services.
Therefore, the amount of technical training given to technicians is herein considered to be one of the key operational
resources for a smooth MRO operation, as it directly affects
TAT. Examples of technical training include:

N aircraft model specific: the MRO firm must have all
the technicians trained in all the aircraft models for
which it is certified to work on;
N special services: such as nondestructive inspection
(eddy current, x-ray, dye penetrant, magnetic particle,
ultrasound), borescope inspections;
N standard maintenance practices.
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There are other types of non-technical training, which
might not affect productivity directly, but are usually
given to MRO company employees. Some examples are:
aviation regulations; lean manufacturing; language courses;
customer relations; safety management system; human
factors; etc.
A study conducted by Dinero (2005) in the aerospace
company Northrop Aircraft Inc. demonstrates many positive results that were achieved plant wide after consistent
training of 1241 employees. The results were: production
increase of 17%; break-in time to train a person on a new
job reduced by 22%; rejections reduced by 12%; scrap
reduced by 27%; injuries reduced by 45%.
The model presented here uses the production increase
data from Dinero (2005) to establish the relation between
investment in training and expected TAT gains:
ETItr ~(TItravg zIGtr );

ð29Þ

with TItravg representing the average TAT increase due to
lack of training. The time increase TItravg is calculated as the
optimum TAT (determined based on experience and
benchmarking for when 100% resources are available)
multiplied by 17% (this percentage represents the potential
efficiency increase based on Northrop Aircraft Inc.’s case
(Dinero, 2005)):
TItravg ~TATavg z0:17:

ð30Þ

The investment gap in training IGtr is expressed as
IGtr ~

(IRtr {ISOEMtr {IMROtr )
;
IRtr

{ISOEMtr
;
GPOEM

IGPMROtr ~

({IMROtr zISOEMtr )
;
GPMRO

ð33Þ

where GPMRO is the MRO firm’s annual gross profit (also a
parameter to be set in accordance with the size of the MRO
company).
Model Output
Gross Profit
The total impact on an OEM’s gross profit takes into
account all the investments made in MRO firms as well as
the gains obtained with in-service data collected from those
maintenance providers. Thus, the final balance is given by
IGPOEM ~IGPOEMsp zIGPOEMto zIGPOEMinv z
IGPOEMpd zIGPOEMtr ;

ð34Þ

where the indices sp, to, inv, pd, and tr refer to spare parts,
tooling, inventory, product data, and training, respectively.
The total impact on the MRO firm’s gross profit resulting from investments received from the OEM is given by
IGPMRO ~IGPMROsp zIGPMROto zIGPMROpd zIGPMROtr :ð35Þ

ð31Þ

where IRtr represents the required investment in training by
the MRO company in order to achieve optimal productivity
and ISOEMtr is the investment shared by the OEM with the
MRO company. IMROtr is the actual investment in training
made by the MRO company. In summary, according to this
rationale, the smaller the investment gap, the lower the risk
of TAT delay due to lack of training.
The model presented here supports the financial feasibility assessment process of the proposed collaborative PSS
by analyzing the impact on gross profit of both stakeholders created by related costs and investments. In that
sense, OEM investment in MRO companies by providing
financial incentives for training would cause a negative
impact on the OEM’s gross profit. On the other hand, that
same investment would have a positive impact on the
MRO company’s gross profit as this company would be
reducing expenditures related to training courses. Hence
the model proposes to calculate the annual impact on an
OEM’s gross profit resulting from its investment in
training IGPOEMtr as
IGPOEMtr ~

where GPOEM is the OEM’s annual gross profit (a parameter within the model that must be set in accordance
with the size of the OEM).
The impact on an MRO firm’s gross profit resulting from
investment in training received from the OEM is

ð32Þ

Operator’s Savings
The proposed collaborative approach aims at adding
value to operators as a result of two main reasons: 1) these
companies will operate a more reliable aircraft, which will
require less maintenance due to increased scheduled maintenance intervals; and 2) MRO enterprises will deliver
more efficient services, being able to reduce the TAT of
heavy checks, thus providing operators with reduced aircraft downtime.
As mentioned before, the variable TOpSisdata represents
the financial gains produced by the reliability increase.
Herein, Opsrdt defines the operator’s cost savings promoted
by reduced aircraft downtime during heavy checks, being
calculated as follows:
OpSrdt ~DTRAC |LDC|NNHCperAC=Y |OFS;

ð36Þ

where LDC is a parameter related to aircraft leasing cost per
day. DTRAC is the downtime reduction per aircraft in days,
and is formulated as a function of the resources availability
level:
DTRAC ~MDThc {(TATopt zETI);

ð37Þ

where the parameter MDThc corresponds to the acceptable
maintenance downtime for a heavy check as per market
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requirements. TATopt is the parameter that specifies the
optimal TAT that an MRO company is able to achieve if
100% of resources are available. This value can be estimated by an MRO expert. ETI represents the total expected
TAT increase during a heavy check execution in the MRO
company due to lack of resources, and is calculated as
ETI~ max (A)zETItr ;

ð38Þ

where
A~½ETIcp , ETIlep , ETIhep , ETIrot , ETINDI , ETIhc ,
ETIst , ETIts , ETIsi , ETIid , ETIfd , ETIcmm , ETIsb : ð39Þ
Therefore, the operator’s total savings TOpS is defined as
TOpS~TOpSisdata zOpSrdt :

ð40Þ

Limitations
The presented model does not consider the possibility of
MRO companies sharing a percentage of their revenue
(generated by the collaborative approach) with OEMs, nor
quantifies potential gains that a manufacturer could obtain
as a result of strengthening its brand due to a stronger services network. Therefore, additional value can be generated
to OEMs if these opportunities are considered. Research
is required to develop mathematical relations that could
describe how a stronger OEM brand could result in more
sales and thus increased revenues.
It is also important to highlight that the presented
model allows analysis of business models that involve
only one type of aircraft and heavy check at a time.
Therefore, future work is encouraged to enhance this
model to account for multiple types of aircrafts and
heavy checks.
The collaborative approach proposed herein between
airframe OEMs and MRO enterprises could be extended to
manufacturers of aerospace components and their respective independent service network. For instance, business
relations between engine manufacturers and the related
maintenance shops could be similarly mapped in a quantitative model to promote creation of collaborative partnerships. In summary, the concept of designing structured
collaboration business models can be studied and applied
to many other types of components such as landing gears,
auxiliary power units, electronic modules, etc. However,
the collaboration approach would make more sense for highvalue-added components due to the possibility of more significant savings with the cost-of-opportunity resulting from
reduced maintenance TATs.
Emerging technologies such as additive manufacturing
and artificial intelligence can be studied within the context
of this research to address issues related to spare parts availability and troubleshooting time, respectively.
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Moreover, this research identifies opportunity for further
studies to develop mathematical models to describe how
acquisition of in-service data can reduce maintenance
intervals due to increased product reliability. This work
describes such relations based on assumptions created
from data published by Boeing and Airbus on reductions
obtained in maintenance intervals due to increased product
reliability and use of in-service data. A future study could
be conducted within the broad area of big data analytics,
which is gaining increasing attention in the aerospace
industry.
Concluding Remarks
Motivated to resolve challenges faced by airframe
OEMs, MRO firms, and operators, this paper proposes
a quantitative model to support collaborative business
approaches. In the context of this model, the reader shall
understand collaboration as how OEMs and MRO firms
can exchange product and in-service data, share risks, and
split investments to deliver high-level services to operators.
Further, the amount of investments made by OEMs or MRO
companies in any of the required resources (i.e., product
data, spare parts, tooling, or training) represents the level of
financial collaboration from each company. The higher
the total investments, the more maintenance capacity the
MRO company will offer, thus the shorter will be aircraft
downtime during heavy maintenance, meaning higher
savings to operators.
The presented model has been built based on real
information and knowledge that exists in an independent
airframe MRO firm in South America and its interactions
with different airframe OEMs. The main business dependencies between the two stakeholders have been mapped to
formulate the relationships by which they exchange key
operational resources. Additionally, the model has captured
the financial implications on operators’ revenue as a function of TAT variations, resulting from fluctuations of
resources availability. Therefore, this quantitative model
represents the main contribution of this research to the literature and is intended to aid OEMs and MRO companies
with the assessment of business collaboration alternatives,
where economic feasibility can be individually calculated
for each player based on the balance between the amount
of investments in operational resources and the financial
returns for each company.
The presented model is exercised in Part II of this paper
for different sets of parameter values, determined according
to the characteristics of the involved companies, such as
enterprise size, type of aircraft that comprise the operator’s
fleet, projected production capacity of the MRO firm, etc.
For instance, the size of the required inventory will depend
on the proposed production capacity of the MRO company,
so the higher the desired capacity, the larger the required
inventory; gross profit will vary with the size of the
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company; an operator’s annual savings will depend on its
fleet size and on the number of flight hours that each
aircraft performs; the market average downtime for a heavy
check depends on the type of aircraft being considered.
Therefore, the companion paper will demonstrate the
model, comparing results for two different combinations
of companies: 1) a large OEM, a small MRO firm, and a
small operator; and 2) a large OEM, a large MRO firm,
and a large operator. We note that the quantitative collaborative model can also be used for optimal decisionmaking when considering more complex investment
scenarios and increased number of resources or identification of partnerships that maximize the gross profit of
OEMs and MRO companies as well as operators’ savings.
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